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So Similar, So Diﬀerent, So Chinese: Analytical Comparisons
of the Confucius Institute with its Western Counterparts
Xin Liu
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ABSTRACT
This article adopts the lens of a global “cultural terrain of struggle” in
unfolding analytical comparisons of the Confucius Institute with its
Western counterparts in three layers: their purposes, operating mod-
els and provisions. It explains why the Confucius Institute has similar
goals to its Western counterparts but is perceived diﬀerently from
them, and what gives the Institute its unique Chinese features. The
hidden barriers are revealed by employing the theoretical frame-
works of Orientalism, cultural hegemony and the knowledge–
power nexus. The diﬀerence in operating models is surely a major
factor that distinguishes the Confucius Institute from its Western
counterparts, but it is an oversimpliﬁcation to only focus on the
visible diﬀerence in locations without challenging the roles of
Orientalism and cultural hegemony, at the heart of which lie hidden
diﬀerences in power positions in this uneven terrain. In discussing
some closures of Confucius Institutes, the article also reveals that the
Chinese government’s role as both a sponsor and censor is another
critical diﬀerence and a major factor that attracts scepticism.
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Introduction
Confucius Institutes (CIs) are non-proﬁt public institutions that aim to “develop and
facilitate the teaching of the Chinese language overseas and promote educational and
cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other international commu-
nities” (Hanban, 2019b). Managed and funded by the Oﬃce of Chinese Language
Council International, commonly referred to by its Chinese abbreviation, Hanban, the
ﬁrst CI was opened in November 2004 in Seoul, South Korea. The latest statistics
indicate that by December 2018, there were 548 Confucius Institutes and 1,193
Confucius Classrooms opened in 146 countries and regions around the world
(Hanban, 2019a). Both its impressive speed of expansion and the global coverage
have gained the CI the reputation of the “ﬂagship” of China’s cultural diplomacy,
which is deﬁned as “the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions,
beliefs and other aspects of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understand-
ing” (Cummings, 2009, p. 1, emphasis added).
As a relatively new concept, however, cultural diplomacy tends to be mixed with the
umbrella term of public diplomacy, which refers to the “active, planned use of cultural,
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educational and informational programming to create a desired result that is directly
related to a government’s foreign policy objectives” (McClellan, 2004, emphasis added).
According to Ham, public diplomacy is aimed at “inﬂuencing a foreign government
through inﬂuencing its citizens” (2005, p. 57, emphasis added), or even “to advance the
interests and extend the values of those being represented” according to Paul Sharp (cited
in Melissen, 2005, p. 11, emphasis added). A clear diﬀerence in purpose can be seen
from the above deﬁnitions, but the Chinese attempt at using the CI as a vehicle of
cultural diplomacy is often interpreted as a tool for public diplomacy. This mismatch
between its own intentions and the perceived goals seems to be unique to the CI
compared with its Western counterparts. In fact, the CI does not try to hide its
intention to copy the successes of its “forerunners”, as is made clear on its oﬃcial
website:
Beneﬁting from the UK, France, Germany and Spain’s experience in promoting their
national languages, China began its own exploration through establishing non-proﬁt
public institutions with an aim to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign
countries in 2004: these were given the name of Confucius Institute (Hanban, 2019a).
This is a ready acknowledgment that the CI tries to follow in the footsteps of the UK’s
British Council, France’s Alliance Française, Germany’s Goethe Institute and Spain’s
Cervantes Institute. Although the CI is neither comparable in history and scope with
the Alliance Française, which has operated for more than 130 years and has more than
800 establishments (Alliance Française, 2019), nor comparable in scale and impact
with the British Council, which administers 3 million IELTS tests every year whose
results are accepted by more than 10,000 organisations globally (British Council,
2019c), comparisons are frequently made between the CI and these organisations in
both the media and academic literature. This article, however, tries to show how
a diﬀerent picture can be revealed by adopting the lens of a global “cultural terrain of
struggle” and the theoretical frameworks of Orientalism, cultural hegemony and the
knowledge–power nexus to engage in analytical comparisons. It also goes a step
further in revealing the “diﬀerences in similarities” and “similarities in diﬀerences”,
as well as the reasons behind them. The article presents the comparisons in three
layers of why, how and what: the purposes, operating models and activities of these
organisations.
Purposes
If we look at the British Council, Alliance Francaise, Goethe Institute and Cervantes
Institute, it is not hard to see that all of these countries engaged in cultural diplomacy
are trying to achieve a similar goal – namely, to improve their international status and
the position of their cultures in the global multicultural spectrum through the promo-
tion of their languages. For example, at the founding of the British Council in 1934, the
Prince of Wales clariﬁed that:
We are aiming at something more profound than just a smattering of our tongue. Our
object is to assist the largest number possible to appreciate fully the glories of our
literature, our contribution to the arts and sciences, and our pre-eminent contribution
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to the political practice. This can best be achieved by promoting the study of our language
abroad (cited in Pennycook, 2013, p. 147).
Similarly, the Goethe Institute, Alliance Française and Cervantes Institute have all
suggested that learning the language is only a means to the end of appreciating cultural
diversity. China with its CI is no exception here:
Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people from diﬀerent
countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, to enhancing under-
standing of the Chinese language and culture by these peoples, to strengthening educa-
tional and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other countries, to
deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting the development of
multiculturalism, and to constructing a harmonious world (Hanban, 2019b).
However, a delicate diﬀerence in wording is worth noting, in that the British Council
says: “Our work in English aims to bring high quality language materials to every
learner and teacher who wants them” (British Council, 2019b). The word “want”
actually reveals its superior position in the cultural terrain: “demand” could be driven
by practical needs, while “want” is driven by voluntary desires. Other non-English-
speaking countries such as France, Germany and Spain all refer to the goals as “(to)
promote” their languages and “spread” the culture, but the CI Constitution (quoted
above) carefully refers to oﬀering the service to “satisfy demands” and “enhance under-
standing”. These deliberations reveal at least two diﬀerences in the purposes of these
organisations:
(1) To “satisfy demands”: instead of actively “promoting” its language or “spreading”
its culture, the CI puts itself in the position of “responding” to the “sharp
increase in the world’s demands for Chinese learning” brought about by the
“rapid growth” of China’s economy and exchanges with the world (Hanban,
2019a).
(2) To “enhance understanding”: this indicates that there is insuﬃcient understand-
ing of the Chinese language and culture at present, or even some distorted
understandings, as argued by the then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang (2011)
and scholars such as Zhu (2012), setting a diﬀerent priority for the CI in
comparison to its Western counterparts.
These diﬀerences show a mixture of “pride and prejudice”: in the domestic context,
there is a dose of national “pride” when China gains strength again; for almost the very
ﬁrst time in its modern history, a sense of cultural pride ascends. The “rapid growth” of
the economy and the “sharp increase” in the demand for learning Chinese not only
justiﬁes what the CI is trying to do, but signiﬁes the growing inﬂuence of China, which
is articulated and communicated through the new leadership vision of the “China
Dream of national rejuvenation” to domestic audiences. When today’s rising China
needs a symbol to ﬁll the ideological void and unify the nation, Confucianism brings
state nationalism, popular nationalism and cultural nationalism together. From the
Chinese perspective, choosing Confucius as the namesake signiﬁes the revival of tradi-
tional Chinese culture. While constructing domestic legitimacy, it is a proud task to be
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called on to “satisfy the demands” for learning Chinese language and understanding
Chinese culture.
In the international context, however, there is a need to counter the existing “prejudice”
or misconceptions that discursively deﬁne China outside its borders. To “enhance under-
standing” is therefore the other task set for the CI with the hope of also constructing global
legitimacy. As one scholar noted, “the founding of the CI is, by and large, an image
management project . . . to promote the greatness of Chinese culture while counterattacking
public opinion that maintains the China threat” (Guo, 2008). The idea of building
a “harmonious world” is essentially a Confucian concept that is now written into the
mission statement of Hanban, to remind the world that China is not so much “rising” as
reasserting its status while reinforcing the peaceful nature of its resurgence. However, using
Confucius as the brand imagemay not be a sound approach to counter prejudice in a world
where “national identity is marketed for political spin” (Louie, 2011, p. 99). Confucius is
more than just a cultural icon of wisdom and learning, and Confucian values do not just lie
at the core of traditional Chinese culture: they were also given an ideological function in
maintaining political order. Besides, the translation of Rujia sixiang (儒家思想) as
“Confucianism” established a narrow link between Confucius himself and the complex
system of moral, social, political, philosophical, ethical and quasi-religious thought and
value systems that were developed over thousands of years after him. Meanwhile, the
complexity of Confucianism has often been the victim of journalistic simpliﬁcation, in
that the multifaceted image of Confucianism is often only shown to represent authoritarian
and hierarchical rule. So, in a way, the name itself is like a label that implies being the
“cultural other” and “ideological other” in the eyes of those who still see China with
prejudice. The inherent constraint that puts many of the Confucian ideas in conﬂict with
modernity tends to be challenged by some Western scholars, for example, Louie (2011,
p. 100), who argued that:
Domestically, the advocacy of Confucianism will in practice lead to the promotion of very
conservative and inconsistent values. Internationally, if such values are to be paraded as
the best of “Chinese” essences, China’s contribution to world culture will be a confused
and regressive one.
Confucianism has been entrenched in Chinese political thinking for thousands of
years, and survived all of the attempts at its destruction over the past century, either
in the name of democracy (the New Culture Movement in 1912) or revolution (the
Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976). Its resurgence in popularity in recent years
signals its relevance in the vertical time line of the modern world today, and also its
worthy place in the horizontal dimension of space as a counterbalance to Western
values. However, this was immediately seen as a challenge to Western hegemony by
some scholars such as Huntington (1998, p. 93), who argued that “East Asia attributes
their dramatic economic development not to their import of Western culture but
rather to their adherence to their own culture. . . The revolt against the West is now
legitimated by asserting the superiority of non-Western values”. We can see the
arbitrary equation adopted here between “cultural pride” and “value superiority”,
and a further speculation that the mission of the CI is to promote Confucian values,
and therefore a potential revolt against Western democratic values and a justiﬁcation
of China’s authoritarian rule.
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The above analysis shows that the CI’s purpose is somehow caught between “cultural
pride” internally and a “value prejudice” externally, which can help further explain the
next question: why, unlike its Western counterparts, the CI’s intentions are often
questioned, with suspicion of ideological inﬁltration, particularly by some academics
and media in Western countries.
Why is the CI’s purpose perceived diﬀerently?
This question was also asked by a China Daily article, but instead of providing
answers, the article just elaborated on its title: “No need to fuss over Confucius
Institute” (C. Liu, 2010). I argue that this question must be answered through both
theoretical reﬂection and empirical investigation to contextualise the operation of the
CI and reveal the actual conﬁgurations underlying the “power struggles” going on in
the global cultural terrain. My analytical framework draws on Gramsci’s concept of
cultural hegemony, Foucault’s theory of power relations and Said’s critique of
Orientalism to reveal the biggest hidden diﬀerence between the CI and its Western
counterparts: it is the same competition, but not a level playing ﬁeld, and they
occupy completely diﬀerent positions in this terrain of struggle dominated by
Western cultural hegemony.
Gramsci (1971) argued that although hegemony is formed through “consent”, it is
constantly readjusted and re-negotiated, as there will always be a counter-hegemonic
struggle. Where there is hegemony, there is resistance, and this is a two-way process:
while the counter-hegemonic side will engage in “a war of position” (another Gramscian
term referring to the cultural struggle of much longer duration and complexity to gain
positions of inﬂuence that can develop counter-hegemony), the hegemonic side will
resist any emerging forces that could challenge its position. When the CI emerged as
a new force in the global cultural terrain, its rapid expansion was quickly identiﬁed by
the hegemonic side as a potential threat to its dominance. In countering the perceived
threat, the hegemons were able to use their power of discourse to determine their
interpretation of the CI’s purpose by highlighting the ideological connotations in the
concept of culture to justify their resistance, and further use their power to turn their
perceptions into “knowledge”. Just as Orientalism is about the Occidental using its Us-
centred interpretation as “knowledge” to represent the Oriental, their study of the Orient
is not to achieve truthful knowledge and perception, but to deﬁne the relationship
between the two, with Western power standing at its very core. Foucault (1980) has
argued that knowledge impregnated with power is no longer an objective reﬂection of
truth, but is presented and accepted as truth with power in practice. In his eyes, there are
three types of struggle: against forms of domination, against forms of exploitation, and
against forms of subjectivity (Foucault, 1982, p. 795). These conceptual frameworks can
shed light on the “terrain of struggle” where the CI is placed: against Western cultural
domination, and against the subjectivity of the modern-day reincarnation of
Orientalism. China’s cultural diplomacy aims to achieve a dialogue between cultural
contestants: it does not seek to negate the hegemonic culture, nor to replace it with a new
hegemony; its appeal of cultural pluralism and harmony means it does not view this
struggle as a zero-sum game, but many Western scholars tend to believe China’s rise is
coming at their expense (Nye, 2005).
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On the other hand, however, some Chinese rhetoric about the CI being state-
sponsored feeds speculation about its purpose. For example, the CI was claimed to
be the “brightest brand for China’s soft power” in a 2007 Xinhua report, and the
CCP Central Committee published a key resolution on promoting the development
of “socialist culture” in 2011, in which the CI was described (along with the Xinhua
News Agency and CCTV) as part of the drive to “create new methods of xuanchuan
to strengthen our international right to speak, respond to foreign concerns, improve
international society’s understanding of our basic national conditions, to display our
country’s image of civilisation, openness and progress” (cited in Hughes, 2014,
p. 55). These comments were seized upon by critics such as Mosher (2012) to
claim that the seemingly benign purpose of the CI leaves out a number of purposes
both salient and sinister – namely, “sanitising China’s image abroad, enhancing its
soft power globally, and creating a new generation of China watchers who are well-
disposed towards the Communist dictatorship”. When such loaded interpretations
of the CI’s intention are combined with the CI’s government connection, many
scholars worry that if there were to be a CI presence on their campus, it would
threaten their academic freedom and independence. But the political dimension in
cultural diplomacy is not a unique “Chinese characteristic”. As Belanger (1999,
p. 678) argued, “cultural diplomacy has never been apolitical, even if in general,
and quite naturally, it claims to be so”. Taylor (1997, p. 80) puts it more bluntly:
“cultural diplomacy is very much a political activity designed to serve national
interests in an ostensibly cultural guise”. Again, the hegemonic side controls
power to leave their own activities under the cultural guise, and only unveils the
political intention for the CI as if it is a special attribute: what “we” do is called
cultural diplomacy, what “they” do is political inroads.
For example, when the American Association of University Professors’ report on
Partnerships with Foreign Governments (2014) compared the CI with its Western
counterparts, these Western institutions were also described as being “clearly connected
to imperial pasts, ongoing geopolitical agendas, and the objectives of soft power”. Since
these institutions share the same political values, their mission is considered harmless,
but the CI is believed to “threaten the independence and integrity of academic institu-
tions in host countries”. Also, the “imperial past” was only mentioned as a passing
comment, ignoring that this past entailed 500 years of colonialism and capitalism that
created today’s Western-centred world in terms of culture, economy and politics. It is
a past replete with the lingering inﬂuence of Orientalism and Western cultural hege-
mony that still shapes today’s global cultural terrain, and puts the West in a superior
position in pursuing geopolitical agendas and the objectives of soft power. This type of
critique dismisses the fundamental diﬀerence in power position between the CI and its
Western counterparts as an understatement, while overstating the CI’s location as the
critical diﬀerence that overrides the similarity in their purposes. Most criticisms of the
CI focus on the fact that it operates within established universities, institutions and
schools around the world, providing funding, teachers and educational materials.
Despite Hanban’s repeated clariﬁcation that the CI’s mission is language teaching rather
than values-promotion as speciﬁed in its Constitution, by-laws and partnership con-
tracts, this model has raised concerns over ﬁnances, academic freedom, legal and ethical
issues, as well as ideological concerns about improper inﬂuence over teaching and
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research (Chey, 2008; Golden, 2011; Guttenplan, 2012; Hubbert, 2014; Hughes, 2014;
Sahlins, 2015). The next section takes a close look at the diﬀerences at this level.
Operating Models
The establishment of a CI follows a formal and regular procedure. Although there are
two other types – those entirely run by Hanban and those entirely run by the host
country under licence from Hanban – a third type, which entails a partnership between
a Chinese home university, an overseas host university and Hanban, is by far the most
common, owing to the advantage of sharing establishment and operating costs and the
prestige derived from association with host universities (Starr, 2009).
The procedure begins with an application proposal from a foreign organisation
(usually a university). The proposal must demonstrate, ﬁrstly, a strong demand for
Chinese language instruction in the university and local community; and secondly, the
willingness of the applicant to contribute (both ﬁscally and physically) to the establish-
ment and the growth of the CI (Starr, 2009). This has often been used by Hanban as the
strongest counter-argument to accusations that China is launching a cultural invasion:
the CI is requested by host universities, not imposed upon them. Once the application
is approved, both institutions receive ﬁnancial beneﬁts: every Chinese home university
receives 200,000 RMB (about US$30,000) from Hanban as the supporting matching
funds for each CI that it sets up, and the overseas host university also receives generous
funding from Hanban, including start-up funds of between US$100,000 and
$US150,000 and an average annual operational fund of US$50,000 (Xu, 2011).
Although the host university is nominally requested to match funding, this is
generally provided in kind, such as campus facilities and oﬃce space, as well as
administrative and accounting services. There is little in the way of out-of-pocket
expenses. As a result, some question whether the CI can represent a soft-power strategy,
as this model may not rely on coercion, but does rely on payments, which “may be
attractive for ﬁnancially stretched educational authorities facing a growing demand for
Chinese language instruction” (Hughes, 2014, p. 69). Although meeting such “growing
demand” is the CI’s remit, the controversies arise on two levels: the way it meets the
demand, and the perceived purpose of projecting soft power, which goes beyond
meeting that demand.
For example, the CI’s model has raised scepticism and concerns that there are strings
attached. The “‘strings’ associated with accepting money may be fairly loose” (Paradise,
2009, p. 662), but there are still worries that those who pay the piper may call the tune. The
common list of censored topics includes the “three Ts” (Tibet, Taiwan and Tiananmen),
human rights, China’s military build-up, and factional ﬁghts inside the Chinese leadership
(Chey, 2008; Golden, 2011; Mosher, 2012; Sahlins, 2015). In other words, it is the
government’s role as sponsor and censor that lies at the core of such worries.
Chinese rationale behind the CI model
It is true that the CI did not copy its Western counterparts’ model of mostly being
based in city centres (although Spain’s Cervantes Institute also partners with foreign
universities and organisations in some cases). As a strategy of “creating alternative
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institutions and alternative intellectual resources within existing society” (Cox, 1983,
p. 165), this deliberate move is a modern-day annotation of Gramsci’s term of “war of
position” to counter hegemony. From China’s point of view, its rationale can be found
in the following three points.
First, the signiﬁcance of establishing CIs in overseas universities can be revealed in
the de facto existence of China as no longer the external “Other”, but part of a living
matrix of “Us”. This is a vitally important move following the knowledge–power nexus:
given that classroom discourse is “very powerful” (Said, 1993, p. 206), and implicitly
either normalises or marginalises certain ideas or values, by being there and telling its
own stories, and inﬂuencing students with people-to-people contacts, the CI is able to
play a subtle role in enhancing mutual understanding.
This was endorsed by Hubbert’s (2014, p. 348) ethnographic research ﬁndings that
“the more personal contacts students had with CI teachers, the less China appeared the
epitome of an authoritarian state”. Also, since the majority of the educated people in the
host countries do not read Chinese, their understanding of China mainly relies
on second-hand information in English, which tends to be imbued with Western
hegemonic perspectives and Orientalist representations. In this sense, language learning
is the ﬁrst step in gaining a more balanced understanding of China, which ﬁts the
identiﬁed mandates of the CI.
Second, using universities as a vanguard would give cultural diplomacy a non-oﬃcial
face. Universities can be driven by their own motivations to pursue exchanges and
cooperation, and thus play the roles of autonomous “diplomats” to aim for win-win
partnerships. As explained by Hughes (2014, p. 71):
When universities allow the activities of CIs to appear on their websites and to use their
logos, they provide them with a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of students and the public
who expect such brands to guarantee a high standard of academic integrity.
Third, according to the three layers of public diplomacy suggested by Cowan and
Arsenault (2008, p. 10), the CI model is actually leading the move from “monologue”
to “dialogue”, then further to “collaboration”, deﬁned as “initiatives that feature cross-
national participation in a joint venture or project with a clearly deﬁned goal”. It is
a much more eﬀective model that can nurture mutual trust and respect, form more
lasting relationships, and generate knowledge and insight that neither had before. The
CI model was also used by Zaharna (2014, p. 9) to exemplify a “network collaborative
approach”, with “relational structures and relational dynamics” as its pivotal features. It
can help “extend the reach and sustainability of the communication” by “transforming
the target audience into stakeholders”. This “stakeholder perspective is reinforced
through co-created narratives and shared identity as well as shared ownership of the
initiative” (Zaharna, 2014, p. 32).
The CI’s model has not only transformed host universities into stakeholders, but also
engaged with local communities and beyond. Apart from reaching out to local schools
and communities for cultural events, hundreds of university presidents and vice
chancellors assemble from all over the world in Beijing for Hanban’s annual conference.
Also in attendance are a wide spectrum of “honourable delegates”, from oﬃcialdom to
academia, from media to business, as well as senior advisors/consultants from various
cultural organisations including the British Council, Goethe Institute and Cervantes
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Institute. It has created a multilevel face-to-face engagement across sectors, amplifying
the knowledge and power nexus. Therefore, both theory and practice seem to suggest
that this model is a smart strategy in the “war of position”.
However, when placed in this terrain of struggle, through the tinted glasses of
ideology, this model is again perceived diﬀerently by the other side: its potential
constraints, both endogenous and exogenous, come to the fore during interactions
with the hegemonic side. By endogenous constraints, I mean factors from within the
CI structure, while the exogenous constraints are caused by factors outside the struc-
ture. The next section looks at these two sets of constraints.
Endogenous constraints of the CI’s operating model
Compared to Alliance Française’s identity as “the ﬁrst cultural NGO in the world” “led
by volunteers” (Alliance Française, 2019), the CI does not claim to be independent from
the government. In fact, the CI has a double identity, as pointed out by Kahn-
Ackermann (2014), the ﬁrst Director of the Goethe Institute in Beijing and currently
advisor to Hanban. The CI headquarters (Hanban) is a Chinese government organisa-
tion, while the CI exists as a local organisation overseas as part of a host university. This
double identity corresponds to both the ﬁrst and third forms of cultural diplomacy
prescribed by the Institute of Cultural Diplomacy (cited in Pan, 2013, p. 24):
(1) state-sponsored cultural diplomacy, which is often used by governments for
distinct political purposes;
(2) independent or semi-independent cultural diplomacy institutions, such as the
British Council and the Goethe Institute, which take an informative and
exchange-based approach to the promotion of national culture; and
(3) potential cultural diplomacy channelled by academic institutions or individual
artists, academics or professionals involved in academic exchanges and cooperation.
These two irreconcilable identities could produce a clash of missions (Hughes,
2014, p. 57):
There is a big diﬀerence between organising a conference with a Chinese university or
working with academic colleagues from China on the one hand, and allowing an institu-
tion that has the mission of promoting the values and interests of the CCP to have a long-
term base on campus and to share in the prestige of the university by having a page on its
website and use of its logo, on the other.
The most sensational way to describe this double identity is as a “Trojan horse”
(Mosher, 2012). The Hanban Director, Xu Lin, directly refuted this accusation, saying
that “CIs are deﬁnitely not Trojan Horses, since we are holding no weapons in our
hands” (cited in Qu, Zhao, & Cheng, 2012), but according to Mosher (2012), this
diﬀerence is so vital that it invalidates the whole comparison of the CI to its Western
counterparts.
Another endogenous constraint of the CI model was raised by Kahn-Ackermann
(2014), who commented that the headquarters of the Goethe Institute guides and
supervises its worldwide networks to maintain standards; they train and develop their
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own staﬀ and some Institute Directors are given lifetime appointments. The CI, mean-
while, does not have “its own people” on site: both the Chinese Director and teachers
are seconded on a short-term basis and some do not even speak the language of the
host country. Being engaged in a cross-cultural collaboration can be a daunting chal-
lenge. It sounds wonderful when both sides are in harmony, but in reality, all kinds of
misunderstandings, disagreements and even conﬂicts can arise. The CI staﬀ are not
trained adequately to conduct intercultural communications, let alone to become
experts in this ﬁeld, which requires knowledge, skills and experience.
This defect in quality assurance was also recognised by Hanban itself. Chen & Yu
(2016) identiﬁed a shortfall of ﬁve million Chinese language teachers worldwide in
2014. Many home institutions do not have suﬃcient expertise in teaching Chinese as
a second language, while others struggle to keep a constant supply of full-time profes-
sional teachers for overseas posting. Career interruptions, family separations and dis-
ruptions to children’s education are the three major “sacriﬁces” teachers have to make,
especially in countries that are not considered as attractive destinations. In an attempt
to keep up with the CI’s rapid proliferation in the past decade, postgraduate students
and high school teachers have been recruited as volunteers. The high turnover rate of
CI tutors (most of whom are employed on two-year contracts) also makes it harder to
maintain standards and continuity of teaching, or to expect long-term commitment
from the teachers.
The other potential problem with this model is that its sustainability can be reliant
on the host university: recent closures have all shown that a CI’s life can come to an end
if it loses the support of the host university. Even a change of staﬀ can have a direct
bearing on a CI’s fate. For example, the decision to close the CI at Stockholm University
was initially announced in 2008 due to concerns about its undue inﬂuence, but the
termination was not executed due to the strong support and inﬂuence from its then-
Director, Torbjörn Lodén, until his retirement in 2014 (Fiskesjö, 2015).
This analysis illustrates that some of the CI’s merits can also have adverse side
eﬀects, just as some of its advantages can be perceived as disadvantages by the other
side. These can be understood as endogenous constraints that are a result of factors from
within the CI structure; the next section looks at exogenous constraints caused by
factors outside the structure.
Exogenous constraints of the CI’s operating model
Although operating as the Cultural and Educational Section of the British Embassy, the
British Council is a “stand-alone organisation” according to its chief executive Martin
Davidson, who believes that the real question has to be one of independence, and that
the CI is “not comparable” due to the self-censorship that comes with the government
funding: “I doubt they have to say, ‘we’ll only give you this money if you never criticise
China’” (cited in Guttenplan, 2012).
How can the British Council, which also gets its funding from the government and is
even based in an embassy, accuse the CI of lacking independence when it is based on
a university campus? A distinction must be made here between government connection
and aﬃliation. Hanban does not just get money from the government: it is under the
leadership of the government, while the British Council deﬁnes its role as focusing on
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“developing people-to-people links and complementing government-to-people and
government-to-government contact” (British Council, 2019a). Its role is to “comple-
ment” government contact, not to “implement” government aims, which may represent
the “degree of separation” that sets the two apart.
Kahn-Ackermann (2014) used the words “small diﬀerence” in describing the govern-
ment connections of the CI and the Goethe Institute. They both rely on government
funding and support, which is of “tremendous help but also a burden”, and both
institutes have to walk the same tightrope between the “political and cultural realms”.
However, I argue that there is a “big diﬀerence” in the “political realm” that gives the CI
model its exogenous constraints. The top three factors contributing to the negative
reports about the CI are: communism, propaganda and threat/danger (Li & Dai, 2011),
which are all inter-related. In Germany, critics and sinologists fear that the inﬂuence of
the Chinese state on the CI would put “German universities at risk of becoming
mouthpieces for the Chinese Communist Party” (Ricking, 2012). Here we can see
a tacit “equation” of the Chinese government and the Communist Party, which in
turn is synonymous with authoritarian rule and a threat to democracy. Therefore,
people who dislike the Chinese political system tend to see state involvement in the
CI as “dangerous communist propaganda”. In other words, being the “ideological
other” is a more salient label, and this one big diﬀerence that “springs from the
authoritarian nature of the Chinese political system” (Hartig, 2012, p. 70) overrides
the similarity in government funding.
On the other hand, the Chinese government’s presence, which tends to be much
more “in the limelight” compared with Western governments’ backstage role, fosters
such speculation. A lot of the CI’s media exposure is because of high-proﬁle oﬃcial
visits from state leaders. Images of visiting oﬃcials are often used in negative Western
media reports about the CI. For example, in reporting on the closure of Chicago
University’s CI in 2014, the BBC used a picture of Xi Jinping unveiling a CI plaque
in Melbourne in 2010. The Telegraph, meanwhile, used a picture of Liu Yandong, Vice
Premier and Council Chair of the CI Headquarters, speaking at George Washington
University’s CI in 2013. A picture of Xi attending a function at the Stockholm CI in
2010 was also used by the South China Morning Post in its 2015 report on this CI’s
closure. A reading of the “Milestones in 2014” in the CI’s Annual Development Report
(2014, pp. 54–69) shows 17 high-proﬁle oﬃcial visits to CIs by senior Chinese leaders,
including six from Xi himself. These visits seem to make the implicit connection with
government more explicit. In comparison, pictures of state leaders are rarely found on
the websites of the CI’s Western counterparts.
If the government’s presence is an overt demonstration of the CI’s aﬃliation with
government, censorship within China itself is another source of exogenous constraint,
even if it is not directly about what the CI does. For example, Xi Jinping’s speech in
December 2014 calling for tighter ideological control in universities was followed by
a ban on textbooks that promote Western values (Xinhua, 2015). This has attracted a lot
of attention from the international media, including the BBC, Guardian, Daily Mail and
Reuters; as a result, the lack of academic freedom on domestic university campuses has
raised suspicion about the CI’s interference in academic freedom overseas. A professor
of political science at the University of Waterloo, which hosts a CI, called this the
“unintended consequences of their close alignment with Beijing” (cited in Little, 2010).
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The discussions so far have revealed that despite the merits of the CI model, it also
comes with both exogenous and endogenous constraints that distinguish the CI from its
Western counterparts. As Starr (2009) has summarised, these constraints fall into two
categories: “insiders” with practical concerns and “outsiders” with ideological concerns.
As a way to overcome these constraints, the CI model has another level of diﬀerence: its
ﬂexibility and non-uniformity. Compared with its Western counterparts, which mostly
follow a standard operating model all over the world, prescribed by their headquarters,
the CI’s model has the ﬂexibility to adapt to local conditions. The next section
elaborates on the last aspect of the comparison: the provisions of the CI and its
Western counterparts.
Scope of Activities
According to the 2007 version of the CI’s Constitution and by-laws, Confucius Institutes
provide the following services overseas: 1) provide Chinese language teaching; 2) train
Chinese language instructors and provide Chinese language teaching resources; 3) hold
the Chinese proﬁciency test (known as Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi in Chinese, or by the
acronym HSK) and tests for the certiﬁcation of Chinese language teachers; 4) provide
information and consultative services concerning Chinese language education and China’s
culture, economy and society; 5) conduct research on contemporary China (Ren, 2010).
The CI, therefore, mainly focuses on language teaching, with the word “language”
repeated in the top three services. Culture, meanwhile, is only mentioned as an area of
consultative services (point 4). It is unclear when the change was made, but at least after
2012, the last item was changed to “5) conduct language and cultural exchange activities
between China and other countries” (Hanban, 2019b), replacing the term “research” in
the old version. I now compare these two aspects of provision in conducting cultural
activities and research with the CI’s Western counterparts.
Cultural activities: The “what” and “how”
Despite the centralised input from Hanban and the globalised outreach of the CI, no
standard “recipe” can be found for CIs across the world. Each CI has its own focus in
activities, which is allowed if not encouraged by Hanban, and is determined by the speciﬁc
conditions at the home and host institutions. Sometimes, they even provide services other
than those shown in the Constitution, such as advertising jobs with Chinese companies for
local students. The ratio between language and cultural provision also varies from CI to CI,
depending on the host institution. If hosts do not oﬀer Chinese language programs, the CI
can add great value in running Chinese modules or even setting up a degree course.
Otherwise, the CI will add value more in the cultural provisions, both for the host
university and for the wider community. Penn State University is an example of the latter,
since it already has a “very robust Chinese-language program”:
We did not use Chinese teachers from Hanban at Penn State, and did not use Hanban
pedagogical material – this meant that much of the work the CI could do was restricted to
a fairly narrow range of activities within the university – cultural activities and events by
visiting Chinese troupes promoted by Hanban for instance, and then some other activities
outside the university (support for community events) (cited in Redden, 2014).
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Among these cultural activities, the most popular is the China Day at schools. Activities
include calligraphy and brush painting, Chinese food and tea tasting, taiji, Chinese knot
and lantern making, language taster and traditional holiday celebrations. Such cultural
activities are often criticised for reducing the diversity of Chinese cultures to
a “taxidermised” version, or a product of “culturetainment”, meaning “the abridgment
of Chinese civilisation in the name of digestible forms of cultural appeal that can be
readily shipped overseas” (Redden, 2012). During my interview with the current
Director of Goethe Institute China, carried out in August 2015 in his Beijing oﬃce,
Peter Anders enunciated that:
The main and obvious diﬀerence is our understanding of culture is much broader than
those held by the CI concerning cultural activities. Their notion of culture is very
traditional, also in a way very repetitive, meaning they are very much focused on
calligraphy, Chinese cooking etc. These aspects of life are important, but it would be
more successful to open up discussions of contemporary society, to engage with the
discourses of the country where they are. The CIs are very close to the academic world,
they are easily linked up to the other departments of the University, or bring in somebody
from China, this would be a more interesting role to play.
On the one hand, Anders’ remarks seem to support Shambaugh’s (2013) observation of
China’s cultural “footprint” being increasingly broad across the globe, but not particu-
larly deep. On the other hand, they show the dilemma for the CI: since it is based on
a university campus, it has the stage to play a bigger role, but on the other hand, the
controversies it has caused suggest it is safer simply repeating such harmless, traditional
cultural activities. Therefore, it is up to the individual CI to use the scope available, in
either a more trailblazing manner, or a more “play it safe” mode. The second diﬀerence
mentioned by Anders in the interview was the approach of the CI:
Our approach is to develop everything we do together with our partners in the respective
countries – for example, we work closely with ministries and the academic world in China to
promote professionalisation of German teacher training, while my observation is that the
Chinese approach is very much focused on themselves: talking about the signiﬁcance of
Chinese tradition and culture, emphasising the diﬀerence of the Chinese way. Of course, it
is right there are diﬀerences and that’s why we’re here, to discuss the diﬀerences, but we felt the
diﬀerent approach is they want to promote themselves, and we promote the partnership.
This remark is a little ironic in that the CI model itself is a partnership. Nothing is more
critical than getting a partner on board in order to make a partnership work. Hanban is
actually using the Goethe Institute as a consultant: they meet regularly to exchange
ideas, and Anders’ comments can suggest areas of improvement to Hanban.
Research: A unique element associated with the CI model
A quick comparison between the scope of activities oﬀered by the CI and its Western
counterparts would show one distinct element – research – that is only oﬀered by the
CI, which may have to do with its unique model of being based on university campuses.
The removal of “research” from the CI’s oﬃcial mandate is intriguing, and there has
been no explanation for its removal. However, research activities have not entirely
disappeared. In November 2012, the new “Confucius China Studies Program” was
launched to channel research from overseas campuses to China. This program
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comprises a series of research projects, and includes generous scholarships such as the
PhD in China Fellowships, Young Leaders in China Fellowships, and Understanding
China Fellowships, which support academics from foreign universities to “undertake
research with Chinese researchers in China” (Hanban, 2014). This could be considered
a clever move whereby “stepping backward is actually moving forward” by inviting
foreign scholars to study the “Other” with the “Other” in the “Other”’s land. It is
consistent with the CI’s priority task of enhancing mutual understanding, but it has also
attracted scepticism and concern, and even led to the closure of the Lyon Confucius
Institute (LCI) in September 2013.
The closure was rarely reported until “The Debate over Confucius Institutes” was
published on China File in June 2014. The Chair of the LCI Board explained in the
debate that since a “new director taking his instructions directly from Beijing arrived in
Sep. 2012”, he
insisted strongly on a deeper integration of the LCI in the University itself through
participating in teaching of the University degree programs and partnership with the
university research centres on the Confucius China Studies Program to send PhD students
to study in China (cited in China File, 2014).
As disclosed in a BBC investigation (2015), the CI’s new move was perceived as gaining
leverage over independent research. When this “interference” was deemed to be “inap-
propriate since it would put in doubt our academic freedom”, and thus refused by the
LCI Board, Xu Lin demanded the resignation of the LCI Board chair and announced
without warning the suspension of Hanban’s funding. As a result, the LCI eventually
ceased its activities, becoming the ﬁrst CI to close due to a research controversy.
If we look into the reasons behind the Penn State University CI’s closure, “research”
appears to have played a similar role. This CI is one of the few that included “research”
speciﬁcally in its mission statement, and according to a report in the New York Times
(Jacobs & Yu, 2014), it was “Hanban’s regular rejection of their research plans, includ-
ing those on the environment, science and politics, saying they were beyond the scope
of CI’s mission” that led to the termination of the partnership.
An interesting comparison can be made between the two cases. For LCI, Hanban
demanded that the CI oﬀer sinology PhD scholarships in China through its partnerships
with the university, and this caused the relationship to falter. In the Penn State case, the
host wanted to use CI resources to support more research activities, but these ideas were
rejected by Hanban for being too far outside its oﬃcial remit. These two cases may seem
to contradict each other, but if we look at the actual “war of position”, we can see it is the
same ﬁght for power: the signiﬁcance of the Confucius China Studies program is that
China’s contribution to research is not just in the form of funds, but more in terms of
“knowledge” production. Just providing funds to the host university to do research in
which the CI has no direct participation, and thus no control over the research ﬁndings,
does not make any desirable contribution to gaining a position of inﬂuence.
The most widely-reported CI closure happened at the University of Chicago, which also
identiﬁed itself as a “research-oriented” CI. The university’s oﬃcial statement referred to
the role of Hanban as the only reason for the decision to suspend negotiations for the
renewal of the agreement. These cases of CI closures oﬀer us a lot of food for thought. We
can see from the above examples that research can be a ﬂashpoint in the interactions
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between China scholars, host universities, and the Chinese government. In a way, they
demonstrate the tension and potential damage that the endogenous and exogenous con-
straints of the CI model can produce, as the role played by Hanban as the third party is key
to the termination of these partnerships. On the other hand, in the current terrain where
the US and Europe hold and try to maintain their “positional superiority”, it seems that no
matter whether the CI wants to be actively engaged in research or passively refuses to get
involved, it all leads to the same discord in the partnerships, which reveals the hidden power
relations at the core of these interactions: the hegemonic side holding vantage positions can
easily manoeuvre a blocking action based on the CI’s location on campus, which was
translated as a threat to academic freedom and has become a recurring criticism of the CI.
Through the repetition of the same discourse, this perception is manufactured as generally
accepted “knowledge” for all the CIs despite their multifarious provisions.
A lesson to be learned is to reduce the government’s presence and make the role played
by the CI Board more visible, as it consists of both Chinese and foreign scholars, including
professors and executive management of the host institutions who have a direct say in the
CI’s decision-making. More voices need to be given to people-in-the-know who can oﬀer
substantial counter-evidence as the pinch of truth to manufactured “knowledge”.
Conclusion: So Similar, So Diﬀerent, and So Chinese
This article has used the lens of “terrain of struggle” to examine what distinguishes the
CI from its Western counterparts operating in the same terrain. It has applied theories
of Orientalism, cultural hegemony and the knowledge–power nexus to make analytical
comparisons that addressed a much broader and deeper dimension beyond the super-
ﬁcial diﬀerences in government connections and operating models. The results can be
summarised as being “so similar, so diﬀerent, and so Chinese”:
● The missions are very similar; one can even venture to say that government
involvement is also a similarity, but they turn out to be perceived as being very
diﬀerent;
● What is visibly diﬀerent is the deliberate wording of the CI’s purpose, its speciﬁc
operating model and the unique element of research in the range of provisions.
But when seen in diﬀerent historical, cultural and ideological contexts, a largely
hidden and vital diﬀerence is revealed: the uneven condition in this terrain
dominated by Western cultural hegemony, and the ensuing diﬀerent power posi-
tions and relations between the CI and its Western counterparts. This hidden
diﬀerence explains the perceived diﬀerences in the CI’s intentions and government
involvement;
● The Chinese government’s presence both “behind the scenes” and “on-stage” is
a distinctive Chinese characteristic. It brings the government “background” to the
“foreground”, and is thus easily seized upon by the hegemonic side to generate
suspicion and resistance.
Through the lens of “terrain of struggle”, we can see how some of the similarities between
the CI and its Western counterparts are converted into diﬀerences: the similar purpose of
language and culture promotion is interpreted with political connotations, turning the CI
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into an imagined propaganda vehicle; the similar funding sources from government are
also interpreted as “strings attached” for the CI because of the diﬀerent ideology of the
Chinese government. This lens reveals that the diﬀerence is not in the organisation itself,
but in power relations with others, as sharply pointed out by Foucault (1982, p. 791) – “the
fundamental point of anchorage of the relationships is to be found outside the institution”.
If we detach the organisation from the terrain of struggle it is placed in, we distort and
inhibit the possibility of a comprehensive analysis.
A speciﬁc example is the CI’s purpose, for we can see a clear disjunction between
Hanban’s aspiration and the external perceptions of it. Of course what matters is not
how the CI sees its own intentions, but how it is perceived by others, just like the
famous Henry Kissinger quote: “It is not a matter of what is true that counts but
a matter of what is perceived to be true” – by the hegemonic side, I would add, and the
power they hold transforms this perception into accepted “knowledge”. McCord (2014)
has observed that the greatest problem with the “anti-CI literature is that it often leaps
from suspicions and concerns to a conclusion of fact”.
While the diﬀerence in operating models is surely a major factor that distinguishes
the CI from its Western counterparts, it is also an oversimpliﬁcation that does not
challenge the Orientalist ground or the “positional superiority” the hegemonic side has
occupied in this terrain of struggle. Instead, this diﬀerence has been magniﬁed through
the lens of ideology, to the extent of negating the comparability of the CI to its Western
counterparts. The way this diﬀerence is over-interpreted is actually a strategy of
struggle. When the CI tries to engage in a “war of position”, it ﬁnds itself being dragged
into a “battle of location”. This strategy has shifted attention away from the real
diﬀerence in power relations, allowing the hegemonic side to maintain its position
through the “locking together of power relationship with strategy and the results
proceeding from these interactions” (Foucault, 1982, p. 795).
This article also dissects some cases of CI closures to reveal the lessons that can be
learned. From Hanban’s point of view, in a sense, it looks to the CI’s Western counter-
parts as role models to learn from and targets to exceed. Although Hanban’s initial gran-
diloquent ambition to condense the achievements of Alliance Française of more than
130 years into 16 years by 2020 was adapted to “having a global distribution network in
nearly 500 major cities all over the world” in 2013 (Xinhua, 2013), it was still acclaimed
as the “spiritual high-speed rail” (Y. Liu, 2014). With its counter-hegemonic stance, the
CI is ﬁghting a “defensive” battle under Western hegemony, but through “oﬀensive”
expansion into overseas educational institutions. The government’s presence as both
the sponsor and censor becomes a critical diﬀerence that breeds scepticism about the
CI. The “scale, speed, resources and strategic thinking” of the Chinese state-led
approach add to the apprehension (Hughes, 2014, p. 75). Perhaps there are better
ways of using government input to move the CI’s model to a more constructive
collaboration and more equal partnership by working on those endogenous and
exogenous constraints. Evaluations of the actual practice and eﬀects of China’s cultural
diplomacy in the ﬁeld need to be carried out for policy impacts.
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